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| the new institutional economics of corruption: The New Institutional Economics of Corruption Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube, Matthias Schramm, 2004-09-16 This book constitutes a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of corruption, as seen from the perspective of New Institutional Economics - one of the most influential new schools of thought in the social sciences of the past decade. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The New Institutional Economics of Corruption Graf Johann Lambsdorff, 2005 |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Industry Self-Regulation Jan Sammeck, 2011-12-06 The idea of self-regulation as an instrument capable of mitigating socially undesirable practices in industries - such as corruption, environmental degradation, or the violation of human rights - is receiving substantial consideration in theory and practice. By approaching this phenomenon with the theory of the New Institutional Economics, Jan Sammeck develops an analytical approach that points out the critical mechanisms which decide about the effectiveness of this instrument. By integrating theory with practical examples of self-regulation, this study highlights the necessity to look at the institutional incentives of an industry, in order to come to a sound judgement about the feasibility and effectiveness of this instrument in a given situation. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutions, Contracts, and Organizations Claude Ménard, 2000 A presentation of contributions from some of the world's leading economists, including Ronald Coase and Douglass North. It demonstrates the extent and depth of the New Institutional Economics research programme with special emphasis on the interaction between institutional factors. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The New Institutional Economics of Corruption , 2005 |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Origin of Wealth Eric D. Beinhocker, 2006 Beinhocker has written this work in order to introduce a broad audience to what he believes is a revolutionary new paradigm in economics and its implications for our understanding of the creation of wealth. He describes how the growing field of complexity theory allows for evolutionary understanding of wealth creation, in which business designs co-evolve with the evolution of technologies and organizational innovations. In addition to giving his audience a tour of this field of complexity economics, he discusses its implications for real-world issues of business. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Scarcity, Conflicts, and Cooperation Pranab Bardhan, 2004-11-05 This wide-ranging review of some of the major issues in development economics focuses on the role of economic and political institutions. Drawing on the latest findings in institutional economics and political economy, Pranab Bardhan, a leader in the field of development economics, offers a relatively nontechnical discussion of current thinking on these issues from the viewpoint of poor countries, synthesizing recent research and reflecting on where we stand today. The institutional framework of an economy defines and constrains the opportunities of individuals, determines the business climate, and shapes the incentives and organizations for collective action on the part of communities; Pranab Bardhan finds the institutional framework to be relatively weak in many poor countries. Institutional failures, weak accountability mechanisms, and missed opportunities for cooperative problem-solving become the themes of the book, with the role of distributive conflicts in the persistence of dysfunctional institutions as a common thread. Special issues taken up include the institutions for securing property rights and resolving coordination failures; the structural basis of power; commitment devices and political accountability; the complex relationship between democracy and poverty (with examples from India, where both have been durable); decentralization and devolution of power; persistence of corruption; ethnic conflicts; and impediments to collective action. Formal models are largely avoided, except in two chapters where Bardhan briefly introduces new models to elucidate currently under-researched areas. Other chapters review existing models, emphasizing the essential ideas rather than the formal details. Thus the book will be valuable not only for economists but also for social scientists and policymakers. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption Susan Rose-Ackerman, 2006 This volume begins with an introductory essay, followed by two chapters written by leading exponents of cross-country research. However, the focus of the handbook is on research at the micro level, where policy can be made and evaluated. The microeconomic studies fall into several overlapping categories. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Economics of Corruption Arvind K. Jain, 2012-12-06 Corruption has been part of our economic and political life since ancient times. During the past few years, there has been a resurgence of interest in understanding the impact that corruption has on our societies. The objective of this volume is to stimulate further studies on corruption by providing a review of existing work in this field and raising some questions that warrant further research. Contributors to this volume synthesize studies dealing with various aspects of corruption and present some new questions regarding the origin and impact of corruption. Accordingly, this volume has two aims. First, it attempts to bring together essential elements of different approaches that have been used to understand corruption. Second, many of the contributors in this volume propose a shift in the focus of studies on corruption away from bribery-type activities to corruption that results in distortion of economic policies. Economics of Corruption seeks to define and model corruption. The contributions in this volume examine the political economy of corruption - that is, why it continues to exist - as well as its consequences, and what measures, if any, can be brought to bear on this phenomenon. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Why Latin American Nations Fail Esteban Pérez Caldentey, Matías Vernengo, 2017-10-03 The question of development is a major topic in courses across the social sciences and history, particularly those focused on Latin America. Many scholars and instructors have tried to pinpoint, explain, and define the problem of underdevelopment in the region. With new ideas have come new strategies that by and large have failed to explain or reduce income disparity and relieve poverty in the region. Why Latin American Nations Fail brings together leading Latin Americanists from several disciplines to address the topic of how and why contemporary development strategies have failed to curb rampant poverty and underdevelopment throughout the region. Given the dramatic political turns in contemporary Latin America, this book offers a much-needed explanation and analysis of the factors that are key to making sense of development today. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Bribery and Corruption in Weak Institutional Environments Shaomin Li, 2019-05-16 Drawing on global empirical evidence, Li offers a novel explanation to the age-old puzzle of why some countries thrive despite corruption. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: New Institutional Economics Éric Brousseau, Jean-Michel Glachant, 2008-09-04 Institutions frame behaviors and exchanges in markets, business networks, communities, and organizations throughout the world. Thanks to the pioneering work of Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Olivier Williamson, institutions are now recognized as being a key factor in explaining differences in performance between industries, nations, and regions. The fast-growing field of new institutional economics analyzes the economics of institutions and organizations using methodologies, concepts, and analytical tools from a wide range of disciplines (including political science, anthropology, sociology, management, law, and economics). With contributions from an international team of researchers, New Institutional Economics provides theoreticians, practitioners, and advanced students in economics and social sciences with a guide to the many recent developments in the field. It explains the underlying methodologies, identifies issues and questions for future research, and shows how results apply to decision making in law, economic policy, management, regulation and institutional design. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Political Economy of Corruption in China Julia Kwong, 2015-04-08 This text examines all facets of corruption: meaning, incidence, monetary value, the kinds of goods exchanged, the perpetrators and their strategies, in China since 1949. It explores the irony of how ideology and organizational structures under socialism can both restrain and encourage corruption. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The New Institutional Economics Eirik Grundtvig Furubotn, Rudolf Richter, 1991 |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Good Cause Gjalt de Graaf, Patrick von Maravic, Pieter Wagenaar, 2010-08-18 Money makes the world go round - corruption The book presents the state of the art in studying the causes of corruption from a comparative perspective. Leading scholars in the field of corruption analysis shed light on the issue of corruption from different theoretical perspectives. Understanding how different theories define, conceptualize, and eventually deduce policy recommendations will amplify our understanding of the complexity of this social phenomenon and illustrate the spectrum of possibilities to deal with it analytically as well as practically. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutional Corruption Seumas Miller, 2017-10-12 This book integrates theoretical accounts of corruption with practical approaches to combating corruption in various public- and private-sector settings. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting Norman Schofield, Gonzalo Caballero, 2011-06-11 This book presents the latest research in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory. The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Why Nations Fail Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, 2013-09-17 NEW YORK TIMES AND WALL STREET JOURNAL BESTSELLER • From two winners of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, “who have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for a country’s prosperity” “A wildly ambitious work that hopscotches through history and around the world to answer the very big question of why some countries get rich and others don’t.”—The New York Times FINALIST: Financial Times and Goldman Sachs Business Book of the Year Award • ONE OF THE BEST BOOKS OF THE YEAR: The Washington Post, Financial Times, The Economist, BusinessWeek, Bloomberg, The Christian Science Monitor, The Plain Dealer Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, or geography that determines prosperity or poverty? As Why Nations Fail shows, none of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Drawing on fifteen years of original research, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is our man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or the lack of it). Korea, to take just one example, is a remarkably homogenous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created those two different institutional trajectories. Acemoglu and Robinson marshal extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, among them: • Will China’s economy continue to grow at such a high speed and ultimately overwhelm the West? • Are America’s best days behind it? Are we creating a vicious cycle that enriches and empowers a small minority? “This book will change the way people think about the wealth and poverty of nations . . . as ambitious as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.”—BusinessWeek |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutional Economics John Groenewegen, A. H. G. M. Spithoven, Antoon Spithoven, Annette Van den Berg, 2010-01-20 Institutional economics is an increasingly important area in the field which also verges into political science and sociology. This concise and lucid textbook, which assumes a basic understanding of neoclassical economics, introduces the key ideas, emphasizing the new institutional economics but grounding readers in the traditional perspectives. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Economics of Transparency in Politics Gianluigi Galeotti, Ronald Wintrobe, 2017-05-15 The purpose of this book is to formulate economic models of the advantages and costs of transparency in various areas of public sector activity and to assess what level of obfuscation in politics is rational. The chapters are arranged in four parts. Part 1 is concerned with the manifestations of transparency and obfuscation in domestic democratic settings whilst Part 2 deals with the same realities but in an international context. Part 3 looks at corruption and Part 4 considers some of the implications of transparency and obfuscation for the working of governments and the formulation of public policies. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Corruption and Government Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bonnie J. Palifka, 2016-03-07 This new edition of a 1999 classic shows how institutionalized corruption can be fought through sophisticated political-economic reform. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Corruption and Development S. Bracking, 2007-11-28 This collection examines anti-corruption campaigns and argues that they have often resulted in perverse and unintended consequences. The book examines how corruption has been addressed (and sometimes tolerated) in Africa, Asia, Latin America and East & Central Europe to interrogate government policy and question development discourse and practice. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Hidden Order of Corruption Donatella della Porta, Alberto Vannucci, 2016-03-23 When corruption is exposed, unknown aspects are revealed which allow us to better understand its structures and informal norms. This book investigates the hidden order of corruption, looking at the invisible codes and mechanisms that govern and stabilize the links between corrupters and corruptees. Concentrating mainly on democratic regimes, this book uses a wide range of documentation, including media and judicial sources from Italy and other countries, to locate the internal equilibria and dynamics of corruption in a broad and comparative perspective. It also analyses the Transparency International Annual Reports and the daily survey of international news to present evidence on specific cases of corruption within an institutional theory framework. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Law and Development Frank H. Stephen, 2018 This book draws on the analytical framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to critically examine the role which law and the legal system play in economic development. Analytical concepts from NIE are used to assess policies which have been supported by multilateral development organisations including securing private property rights, reform of the legal system and financial development. The importance of culture in shaping the legal environment, which in turn influences financial sector development, is also assessed using Oliver Williamson's 'levels of social analysis' framework. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Handbook of Research on Institutional, Economic, and Social Impacts of Globalization and Liberalization Bayar, Yilmaz, 2020-11-06 Globalization is a multi-dimensional concept reflecting the increased economic, social, cultural, and political integration of countries. There has been no pinpointed consensus on the history of globalization; however, the globalization process has gained significant speed as of the 1980s in combination with liberalization. Many countries have removed or loosened barriers over the international flows of goods, services, and production factors. In this context, both liberalization and globalization have led to considerable institutional, economic, social, cultural, and political changes in the world. The liberalization and globalization processes have affected economic units, institutions, cultures, social lives, and national and international politics. The Handbook of Research on Institutional, Economic, and Social Impacts of Globalization and Liberalization provides a comprehensive evaluation of the institutional, economic, and social impacts of globalization and liberalization processes across the world. While highlighting topics like economics, finance, business, and public administration, this book is ideally intended for government officials, policymakers, practitioners, stakeholders, researchers, and academicians interested in the international impacts of globalization and liberalization across a variety of different domains. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Institutional Economics of Water R. Maria Saleth, Ariel Dinar, 2004-01-01 This publication examines issues of water sector reform and performance from the perspectives of institutional economics and political economic studies. The authors develop an alternative quantitative assessment methodology based on the principle of 'institutional ecology', as well as data collected from 127 water experts from 43 countries and regions around the world using a cross-country review of recent water sector reforms within an institutional transaction cost framework. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The New Latin America Fernando Calderón, Manuel Castells, 2020-08-04 Latin America has experienced a profound transformation in the first two decades of the 21st century: it has been fully incorporated into the global economy, while excluding regions and populations devalued by the logic of capitalism. Technological modernization has gone hand-in-hand with the reshaping of old identities and the emergence of new ones. The transformation of Latin America has been shaped by social movements and political conflicts. The neoliberal model that dominated the first stage of the transformation induced widespread inequality and poverty, and triggered social explosions that led to its own collapse. A new model, neo-developmentalism, emerged from these crises as national populist movements were elected to government in several countries. The more the state intervened in the economy, the more it became vulnerable to corruption, until the rampant criminal economy came to penetrate state institutions. Upper middle classes defending their privileges and citizens indignant because of corruption of the political elites revolted against the new regimes, undermining the model of neo-developmentalism. In the midst of political disaffection and public despair, new social movements, women, youth, indigenous people, workers, peasants, opened up avenues of hope against the background of darkness invading the continent. This book, written by two leading scholars of Latin America, provides a comprehensive and up-do-date account of the new Latin America that is in the process of taking shape today. It will be an indispensable text for students and scholars in Latin American Studies, sociology, politics and media and communication studies, and anyone interested in Latin America today. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutional Economics Stefan Voigt, 2019-04-11 A concise and clear introduction to the new institutional economics that summarizes current knowledge whilst addressing its gaps and weaknesses. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North, 1990-10-26 An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Economic Gangsters Raymond Fisman, Edward Miguel, 2008 Economic Gangsters is a fascinating exploration of the dark side of economic development. Two of the world's most creative young economists use their remarkable talents for economic sleuthing to study violence, corruption, and poverty in the most unexpected ways--Steven D. Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Governance and Economic Development Joachim Ahrens, 2002-01-01 '. . . this volume is an excellent resource for those interested in the analysis of institutions' design and economic development. . .' - Oscar Alfranca, Progress in Development Studies The main theme of this study is the political economy of policy reform in less developed countries and post-socialist countries. Given the complexity of economic development and transition, Joachim Ahrens views failures in policy reform, poor public sector management, rent-seeking, corruption, and over-centralization as systematic, though not exclusive, instances of institutional failure. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: The Mechanisms of Governance Oliver E. Williamson, 1999 This text studies transaction cost economics, influential in economic thought on how institutions work. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes it in organizational terms, as a governance structure. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Governing for Prosperity Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Hilton L. Root, 2000-07-11 How do political institutions help promote prosperity in some countries and poverty in others? What can be done to encourage leaders to govern not for patronage but for economic growth? In this book, such distinguished political economists as Douglass North, Robert Barro, and Stephen Haber answer these questions, providing a solution to one of the most important policy puzzles of the new century: how to govern for prosperity. The authors begin from a premise that political leaders are self-interested politicians rather than benign agents of the people they lead. When leaders depend on only a few backers to stay in power, they dole out privileges to those people, thereby dissipating their country’s total resources and national growth potential. On the other hand, leaders who need large coalitions to stay in office implement policies that generally foster growth and political competition over ideas. The result is that those who promote policies that lead to stagnation tend to stay in office for a long time, and those who produce prosperity tend to lose their jobs. Analyzing countries in North and South America and Asia, the authors discuss the range of political regimes that permit or even encourage leaders to rule by mismanaging their nation’s resources. And they show that nations must forge institutions that allow all social groups to participate in and benefit from the economy as well as force political leaders to be responsible for policy outcomes. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Thinking like an Economist Elizabeth Popp Berman, 2022-04-05 The story of how economic reasoning came to dominate Washington between the 1960s and 1980s—and why it continues to constrain progressive ambitions today For decades, Democratic politicians have frustrated progressives by tinkering around the margins of policy while shying away from truly ambitious change. What happened to bold political vision on the left, and what shrunk the very horizons of possibility? In Thinking like an Economist, Elizabeth Popp Berman tells the story of how a distinctive way of thinking—an “economic style of reasoning”—became dominant in Washington between the 1960s and the 1980s and how it continues to dramatically narrow debates over public policy today. Introduced by liberal technocrats who hoped to improve government, this way of thinking was grounded in economics but also transformed law and policy. At its core was an economic understanding of efficiency, and its advocates often found themselves allied with Republicans and in conflict with liberal Democrats who argued for rights, equality, and limits on corporate power. By the Carter administration, economic reasoning had spread throughout government policy and laws affecting poverty, healthcare, antitrust, transportation, and the environment. Fearing waste and overspending, liberals reined in their ambitions for decades to come, even as Reagan and his Republican successors argued for economic efficiency only when it helped their own goals. A compelling account that illuminates what brought American politics to its current state, Thinking like an Economist also offers critical lessons for the future. With the political left resurgent today, Democrats seem poised to break with the past—but doing so will require abandoning the shibboleth of economic efficiency and successfully advocating new ways of thinking about policy. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Beyond the Washington Consensus Shahid Javed Burki, 1999 |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State Mr.Joshua Charap, Christian Harm, 1999-07-01 This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Political Institutions and Development Natalia E. Dinello, Vladimir Popov, 2007-01-01 Political Institutions and Development challenges the cliché that 'good institutions' are essential for sustainable socio-economic development by focusing on the need to adapt potential solutions to local conditions. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Institutions and Economic Theory Eirik G. Furubotn, Rudolf Richter, 2010-10-22 This second edition assesses some of the major refinements, extensions, and useful applications that have developed in neoinstitutionalist thought in recent years. More attention is given to the overlap between the New Institutional Economics and developments in economic history and political science. In addition to updated references, new material includes analysis of parallel developments in the field of economic sociology and its attacks on representatives of the NIE as well as an explanation of the institution-as-an-equilibrium-of-game approach. Already an international best seller, Institutions and Economic Theory is essential reading for economists and students attracted to the NIE approach. Scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. A useful glossary for students is included. Eirik Furubotn is Honorary Professor of Economics, Co-Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany and Research Fellow, Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University. Rudolph Richter is Professor Emeritus of Economics and Director of the Center for New Institutional Economics, University of Saarland, Germany. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Frontiers of Political Economy Guglielmo Carchedi, 1991 Transcending the arid formalism of present-day economic theory, Frontiers of Political Economy develops a new and accessible perspective on the world economy. Guglielmo Carchedi identifies and analyses three key features of modern capitalism: the rapidly increasing share of human labour needed for the advancement of science and technology rather than for the production of goods; the global, rather than national, nature of production, distribution and consumption; and the dominance of the oligopolies. This analysis enables Carchedi to explore new theoretical frontiers: from an original theory of mental and material labour to an investigation of the conditions under which mental labour produces value; from an assessment of the class structure of modern capitalism to an appraisal of the social content of science and technology; from an alternative account of crises, inflation and stagflation to a study of their relation to the destruction of value and to arms production. He also cast fresh light on a number of basic contemporary issues—including the present financial and monetary crisis—and surveys the most important recent controversies in language accessible to non-specialists. Rigorous and wide-ranging, but written with great lucidity, Frontiers of Political Economy is an essential book for both specialists and students in economics and politics. |
| the new institutional economics of corruption: Beyond the World Bank Agenda Howard Stein, 2008-09-15 Despite massive investment of money and research aimed at ameliorating third-world poverty, the development strategies of the international financial institutions over the past few decades have been a profound failure. Under the tutelage of the World Bank, developing countries have experienced lower growth and rising inequality compared to previous periods. In Beyond the World Bank Agenda, Howard Stein argues that the controversial institution is plagued by a myopic, neoclassical mindset that wrongly focuses on individual rationality and downplays the social and political contexts that can either facilitate or impede development. Drawing on the examples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and transitional European economies, this revolutionary volume proposes an alternative vision of institutional development with chapter-length applications to finance, state formation, and health care to provide a holistic, contextualized solution to the problems of developing nations. Beyond the World Bank Agenda will be essential reading for anyone concerned with forging a new strategy for sustainable development. |
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Oct 30, 2012 · insert- old value would be null and new value contain some value update - old and new both have some value delete - old has value but new will not contain value. so by using …
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Nov 9, 2022 · Create new branch git checkout -b At this point I am slightly confused about where you want to commit your current branch. I am assuming that you are …
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As long as the necessary logic to compute the new value can be written as a function of other values in the same row, we can use the .apply method of the DataFrame to get the desired …
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Jun 20, 2016 · the default location for packages is .conda folder in my home directory. however, on the server I am using, there is a very strict limit of how much space I can use, which …
How to check out a remote Git branch? - Stack Overflow
Nov 23, 2009 · With the remote branches in hand, you now need to check out the branch you are interested in with -c to create a new local branch: $ git switch -c test origin/test For more …
python - How to create new folder? - Stack Overflow
Stack Overflow for Teams Where developers & technologists share private knowledge with coworkers; Advertising Reach devs & technologists worldwide about your product, service or …
How can I switch to another branch in Git? - Stack Overflow
Dec 4, 2017 · Check branch again using "git branch" It should now show that you are in the new branch. Now add, commit and push: git add . git commit -m "added new branch" git push origin …
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Jan 22, 2012 · new is the C++ keyword for "create instances of types". my_object[10] is a 10 element array of my_object type. It's simple, obvious, and intuitive. There's no casting, no …
Difference between CR LF, LF and CR line break types
Oct 12, 2009 · This character is used as a new line character in Commodore and early Macintosh operating systems (Mac OS 9 and earlier). The Line Feed (LF) character (0x0A, \n) moves the …
oracle database - PLSQL :NEW and :OLD - Stack Overflow
Oct 30, 2012 · insert- old value would be null and new value contain some value update - old and new both have some value delete - old has value but new will not contain value. so by using …
git - Create a new branch - Stack Overflow
Nov 9, 2022 · Create new branch git checkout -b At this point I am slightly confused about where you want to commit your current branch. I am assuming that you are …
html - target="_blank" vs. target="_new" - Stack Overflow
Feb 10, 2011 · The target attribute of a link forces the browser to open the destination page in a new browser window. Using _blank as a target value will spawn a new window every time …
python - Create new column based on values from other columns …
As long as the necessary logic to compute the new value can be written as a function of other values in the same row, we can use the .apply method of the DataFrame to get the desired …
how to specify new environment location for conda create
Jun 20, 2016 · the default location for packages is .conda folder in my home directory. however, on the server I am using, there is a very strict limit of how much space I can use, which …
How to check out a remote Git branch? - Stack Overflow
Nov 23, 2009 · With the remote branches in hand, you now need to check out the branch you are interested in with -c to create a new local branch: $ git switch -c test origin/test For more …
python - How to create new folder? - Stack Overflow
Stack Overflow for Teams Where developers & technologists share private knowledge with coworkers; Advertising Reach devs & technologists worldwide about your product, service or …
How can I switch to another branch in Git? - Stack Overflow
Dec 4, 2017 · Check branch again using "git branch" It should now show that you are in the new branch. Now add, commit and push: git add . git commit -m "added new branch" git push origin …
c++ - malloc & placement new vs. new - Stack Overflow
Jan 22, 2012 · new is the C++ keyword for "create instances of types". my_object[10] is a 10 element array of my_object type. It's simple, obvious, and intuitive. There's no casting, no …
