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on escalation herman kahn: On Escalation Herman Kahn, 2017-07-12 In this widely discussed and influential book, Herman Kahn probes the dynamics of escalation and demonstrates how the intensification of conflict can be depicted by means of a definite escalation ladder, ascent of which brings opponents closer to all-out war. At each rung of the ladder, before the climb proceeds, decisions must be made based on numerous choices. Some are clear and obvious, others obscure, but the options are always there. Thermonuclear annihilation, says Kahn, is unlikely to come through accident; but nations may elect to climb the ladder to extinction. The basic material for the book was developed in briefings delivered by Kahn to military and civilian experts and revised in the light of his findings of a trip to Vietnam in the 1960s. In On Escalation he states the facts squarely. He asks the reader to face unemotionally the terrors of a world fully capable of suicide and to consider carefully the alternatives to such a path. In the never-never land of nuclear warfare, where nuclear incredulity is pervasive and paralyzing to the imagination even for the professional analyst, salient details of possible scenarios for the outbreak of war, and even more for war fighting, are largely unexplored or even unnoticed. For scenarios in which war is terminated, the issues and possibilities of which are almost completely unstudied, the situation is even worse. Kahn's discussion throws light on the terrain and gives the individual a sense of the range of possibilities and complexities involved and are useful. |
on escalation herman kahn: War's Logic Antulio J. Echevarria II, 2021-02-18 Surveys how American strategic theorists have understood the nature and character of war in the twentieth century. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Essential Herman Kahn Paul Dragos Aligica, Kenneth R. Weinstein, 2009-06-16 By the time of his untimely death in 1983, Herman Kahn was recognized by both friends and intellectual adversaries as 'one of the world's most creative and best minds.' The current growing resurgence of interest in Kahn's ideas and intellectual legacy demonstrates the enduring relevance of his work. Yet, in spite of the constant influence of his arguments, there is a shortage of books summarizing Kahn's essential contributions, and thus his work is not as well known as it should be. The Essential Herman Kahn is an attempt to cope with this predicament and offer the public for the first time an anthology consisting of the essence of Kahn's work, organized thematically. The two decades that have passed since his death allow us today to approach his work undisturbed by the 'sound and fury' of the many public debates and controversies he participated in and to focus on some of the deepest and most enduring dimensions of his intellectual contributions. The anthology will try to bring together, out of the several thousands pages published by Kahn during his life, the 'essential Kahn,' the most relevant, consequential and interesting themes, ideas and arguments defining his legacy. As such it will met the needs of those who are interested in Kahn's work but do not have the time and energy to access his out-of-print books, to make their way through the voluminous number of pages, and then to sort out the essential from the accidental, the perennial from the contextual. |
on escalation herman kahn: On Thermonuclear War Herman Kahn, 1966 |
on escalation herman kahn: Thinking about the Unthinkable Herman Kahn, 1968 |
on escalation herman kahn: Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace Martin C. Libicki, 2012 The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises.--P. [4] of cover. |
on escalation herman kahn: Human Rights in American Foreign Policy Joe Renouard, 2016 Global in scope and ambitious in scale, Human Rights in American Foreign Policy examines American responses to a broad array of human rights violations. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Dangers of Nuclear War Franklyn Griffiths, John C. Polanyi, 1979-12-15 This collection of studies is one of the most lucid and sober analyses of the dangers of nuclear war, which mankind is facing. Written by natural and social scientists, the book should be read both by statesmen and by the general public. Looking towards the end of the century it makes clear the growing dangers. Avoiding complacency on the other hand, and prophecies of doom on the other, it contains a message of hope and an appeal to wisdom. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Direction of War Hew Strachan, 2013-12-05 A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians. |
on escalation herman kahn: Soldiers of Reason Alex Abella, 2009-05-04 An “entertaining and fast-paced” account of the organization that defines the military-industrial complex—and continues to shape our world today (The New York Times Book Review). The RAND Corporation was born in the wake of World War II as a think tank to generate research and analysis for the United States military. It was a magnet for the best and the brightest—and also the most dangerous. RAND quickly became the creator of America’s anti-Soviet nuclear strategy, attracting such Cold War luminaries as Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, and Herman Kahn, who arguably saved us from nuclear annihilation—and unquestionably created the military-industrial complex Eisenhower warned against. In the Kennedy era, RAND analysts and their theories of rational warfare steered our conduct in Vietnam. Those same theories drove our invasion of Iraq forty-five years later, championed by RAND affiliated actors such as Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and Zalmay Khalilzad. But RAND’s greatest contribution might be its least known: rational choice theory, a model explaining all human behavior through self-interest. Through it RAND sparked the Reagan-led transformation of our social and economic system, but also unleashed a resurgence of precisely the forces whose existence it denied: religion, patriotism, tribalism. With Soldiers of Reason, Alex Abella shares a “well-researched” history of America’s last half century that casts a new light on our problematic present (San Francisco Chronicle). |
on escalation herman kahn: Strategy in the Missile Age Bernard Brodie, 2015-12-08 Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. |
on escalation herman kahn: American Arsenal Patrick Coffey, 2014-03 American Arsenal examines the United States' transformation from isolationist state to military superpower by means of sixteen vignettes, each focusing upon an inventor and his contribution to the cause. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition Jonathan Schell, 2000 These two books, which helped focus national attention on the movement for a nuclear freeze, are published in one volume. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Second Nuclear Age Paul Bracken, 2012-11-13 A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to think about the unthinkable. The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age. In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises. Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics. |
on escalation herman kahn: 21st Century Power Brent D. Ziarnick, 2018 This book uses the 21st Century Foundations series format to re-introduce to the military community the writings of General Thomas S. Power, the third Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). His unappreciated works contain many insights into military topics such as technology and the arms race, the nature of deterrence, and the military utility of space. Unifying all of these writings was Power's quest to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Although Power is considered a quintessential Cold Warrior, his ideas are timely considering today's challenges of re-energizing the morale and technology of U.S. strategic forces in the wake of foreign advances, discerning what deterrence means in the Second Nuclear Age, and planning the future of space and cyber power. |
on escalation herman kahn: Atomic Obsession John Mueller, 2012-04-26 John Mueller argues how our obsession with nuclear weapons is unsupported by history, scientific fact, or logic. Examining the entire atomic era, Mueller boldly contends that nuclear weapons have had little impact on history. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Year 2000 Herman Kahn, Anthony J. Wiener, 1967 |
on escalation herman kahn: To Win a Nuclear War Michio Kaku, Afterword by Axelrod, Daniel Axelrod, 1987 To Win a Nuclear War records as fully as we are likely to find what has gone on in the minds of American leaders and nuclear strategists on this awesome subject during these fateful forty years. It is an appalling story... This book compels us to re-think and re-write the history of the Cold War and the arms race.--From the foreword by Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States. To Win a Nuclear War provides a startling glimpse into secret U.S. plans to initiate a nuclear war from 1945 to the present. Based on recently declassified Top Secret documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, this book meticulously traces how U.S. policy makers in over a dozen episodes have threatened to initiate a nuclear attack. The book also documents the surprising reasons why the war plans were never carried out and discloses the deeper, hidden meaning of the Star Wars program. |
on escalation herman kahn: On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue Brad Roberts, 2020-05-10 While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a culminating point where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the red theory of victory. Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their escalation calculus-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies. |
on escalation herman kahn: Theory of Strategy Colin S. Gray, 2018 This book provides a short and accessible introduction to the theory of strategy, examines the general theory of strategy in accordance with 23 key Principles and explains its nature, functions, and intended consequences. Theory of Strategy makes the radical argument that the familiar structure of strategy's general theory (political ends, strategic ways, military means - and assumptions) holds as sound for security at all times and in all places, of human necessity. Strategy is ever-varying in its character, but not in its nature, which is unchanging. |
on escalation herman kahn: Spec Ops William H. McRaven, 1996-06-01 Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Arms Debate Robert A. Levine, 1963 No detailed description available for The Arms Debate. |
on escalation herman kahn: Inadvertent Escalation Barry R. Posen, 2014-01-13 In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve stable nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted. |
on escalation herman kahn: Conventional Deterrence John J. Mearsheimer, 1983 Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939-1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare. Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of offensive weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war. |
on escalation herman kahn: Cold War as Cooperation Roger E. Kanet, Edward A. Kolodziej, 1991-06-18 A study of superpower co-operation since World War II, this book examines the regulation of USA/USSR rivalry, and outlines the power of regional states to constrain and manipulate them for their own interests. |
on escalation herman kahn: Getting MAD Henry D. Sokolski, 2004 Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice is the first critical history of the intellectual roots and actual application of the strategic doctrine of nuclear mutual assured destruction or MAD. Written by the world's leading French, British, and American military policy planners and analysts, this volume examines how MAD and its emphasis on the military targeting of population centers influenced the operational plans of the major nuclear powers and states, such as Pakistan, India, and Israel. Given America's efforts to move away from MAD and the continued reliance on MAD thinking by smaller nations to help justify further nuclear proliferation, Getting MAD is a timely must read for anyone eager to understand our nuclear past and future. |
on escalation herman kahn: Dangerous Thresholds Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Roger Cliff, 2008-07-29 Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition, and today's security environment demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats. This analysis of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on a range of historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad to inform escalation-related decisionmaking. |
on escalation herman kahn: How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind Paul Erickson, Judy L. Klein, Lorraine Daston, Rebecca Lemov, Thomas Sturm, Michael D. Gordin, 2013-11-22 In the United States at the height of the Cold War, roughly between the end of World War II and the early 1980s, a new project of redefining rationality commanded the attention of sharp minds, powerful politicians, wealthy foundations, and top military brass. Its home was the human sciences—psychology, sociology, political science, and economics, among others—and its participants enlisted in an intellectual campaign to figure out what rationality should mean and how it could be deployed. How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind brings to life the people—Herbert Simon, Oskar Morgenstern, Herman Kahn, Anatol Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, and many others—and places, including the RAND Corporation, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Cowles Commission for Research and Economics, and the Council on Foreign Relations, that played a key role in putting forth a “Cold War rationality.” Decision makers harnessed this picture of rationality—optimizing, formal, algorithmic, and mechanical—in their quest to understand phenomena as diverse as economic transactions, biological evolution, political elections, international relations, and military strategy. The authors chronicle and illuminate what it meant to be rational in the age of nuclear brinkmanship. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Coming Boom Herman Kahn, 1982 Om et kommende økonomisk opsving i USA. |
on escalation herman kahn: Thinking about Deterrence Air Univeristy Press, 2014-09-01 With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions. |
on escalation herman kahn: Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era Vipin Narang, 2014-05-25 The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. Vipin Narang identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, he offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. Narang then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security. |
on escalation herman kahn: Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century Thérèse Delpech, 2012-03-28 Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors. |
on escalation herman kahn: Concepts and Models of Escalation Paul K. Davis, Peter J. E. Stan, 1984 This study describes a conceptual decision model for treating escalation processes in the automated war gaming of the RAND Strategy Assessment Center. It also summarizes much of what is known about Soviet views on escalation, and briefly reviews U.S. and Western European views. The study's purpose is to provide a logical structure for writing decision rules, a structure that would assure some level of coherence and completeness while encouraging rule writers to consider specific issues and to keep in mind asymmetries in the U.S., Western European, and Soviet thinking. Section II reviews the classic Western concept of escalation ladders, notes its weaknesses for two-sided war games intended to reflect Soviet-Western asymmetries, and then develops a more appropriate framework. Sections III and IV compare Western and Soviet concepts of escalation. Section V draws upon the issues of preceding sections to sketch out a conceptual escalation model. It then provides a simplified example of how the model might work in a particular scenario. Finally, Sec. VI describes a methodology for actually writing decision rules coherently. |
on escalation herman kahn: The New Arthashastra Gurmeet Kanwal, 2016-10-10 For a country that has fought five wars and is hemmed in by nuclear-armed states, India surprisingly does not have a formally declared national security strategy.All the major powers of the world publish documents that spell out their national interests, identify their threats -- political, economic, diplomatic or with regard to security -- and draw up policies to deal with them. The absence of a similar doctrine makes India's defence policy look ad hoc and creates the impression that the country is unprepared to realize its global ambitions.The New Arthashastra is a path-breaking attempt to recommend a national security strategy for India. It does the difficult groundwork for India's political leaders and policymakers by bringing the best names -- from within the community as well as from the armed forces and academia -- to the ideating table.This collection of twenty essays covers a wide range of topics: nuclear deterrence, defence spending, the domestic production of weapons, and bracing for the wars of the future that will be fought in space and cyberspace. Most important, it presents a roadmap to address India's chief concerns: Chinese assertiveness and Pakistan's unrelenting proxy war.Informed by the expertise of analysts with inside-out knowledge of their domains, The New Arthashastra offers enduring and practical insights to strategists and lay readers alike. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Paradox of Power David C. Gompert, Phillip C. Saunders, 2011-12-27 Looking deeply into the matter of strategic vulnerability, the authors address questions that this vulnerability poses: Do conditions exist for Sino-U.S. mutual deterrence in these realms? Might the two states agree on reciprocal restraint? What practical measures might build confidence in restraint? How would strategic restraint affect Sino-U.S. relations as well as security in and beyond East Asia? |
on escalation herman kahn: Stabilizing Great-Power Rivalries Michael J. Mazarr, Samuel Charap, Abigail Casey, Irina A. Chindea, Christian Curriden, Alyssa Demus, Bryan A. Frederick, Arthur Chan, John Godges, Eugeniu Han, Timothy R. Heath, Logan Ma, Elina Treyger, Teddy Ulin, Ali Wyne, 2021 Leveraging theory and historical cases, the authors identify the factors that keep great-power rivalries stable and those that lead to conflictual outcomes and use that framework to assess the current U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China competitions. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine Barry D. Watts, 2001-09-01 |
on escalation herman kahn: The Responsibility of Intellectuals Noam Chomsky, 2017 Selected by Newsweek as one of 14 nonfiction books you'll want to read this fall Fifty years after it first appeared, one of Noam Chomsky's greatest essays will be published for the first time as a timely stand-alone book, with a new preface by the author As a nineteen-year-old undergraduate in 1947, Noam Chomsky was deeply affected by articles about the responsibility of intellectuals written by Dwight Macdonald, an editor of Partisan Review and then of Politics. Twenty years later, as the Vietnam War was escalating, Chomsky turned to the question himself, noting that intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments and to analyze their often hidden intentions. Originally published in the New York Review of Books, Chomsky's essay eviscerated the hypocritical moralism of the past (such as when Woodrow Wilson set out to teach Latin Americans the art of good government) and exposed the shameful policies in Vietnam and the role of intellectuals in justifying it. Also included in this volume is the brilliant The Responsibility of Intellectuals Redux, written on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, which makes the case for using privilege to challenge the state. As relevant now as it was in 1967, The Responsibility of Intellectuals reminds us that privilege yields opportunity and opportunity confers responsibilities. All of us have choices, even in desperate times. |
on escalation herman kahn: Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Christopher K. Gilmore, Jenny Oberholtzer, Danielle C. Tarraf, 2019 This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's current posture is weak. |
on escalation herman kahn: The Next 200 Years Herman Kahn, William Morle Brown, William Brown, Leon Martel, 1976 In a closely reasoned and carefully documented study, Herman Kahn and his associates at the Hudson Institute give us their expectations for what the next 200 years will bring. |
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