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| from folk psychology to cognitive science: From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science Stephen P. Stich, 1983-01-01 |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science : The Case Against Belief , 1983 |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science , 1983 The average person has a rich belief system about the thoughts and motives of people. From antiquity to the beginning of this century, Stephen Stich points out, this folk psychology was employed in such systematic psychology as there was: Those who theorized about the mind shared the bulk of their terminology and their conceptual apparatus with poets, critics, historians, economists, and indeed with their own grandmothers.In this book, Stich puts forth the radical thesis that the notions of believing, desiring, thinking, prefering, feeling, imagining, fearing, remembering and many other common-sense concepts that comprise the folk psychological foundations of cognitive psychology should not - and do not - play a significant role in the scientific study of the mind. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Do Apes Read Minds? Kristin Andrews, 2012-07-20 Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and generalization from self) that are involved in our folk psychological practices. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Folk Psychology Re-Assessed D. Hutto, Matthew M. Ratcliffe, 2007-09-06 This is a truly groundbreaking work that examines today’s notions of folk psychology. Bringing together disciplines as various as cognitive science and anthropology, the authors analyze the consensual views of the subject. The contributors all maintain that current understandings of folk psychology and of the mechanisms that underlie it need to be revised, supplemented or dismissed altogether. That’s why this book is essential reading for those in the field. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology Garth J. O. Fletcher, 1995 The examination and evaluation of folk psychology and lay cognition has been carried out predominantly in two domains: personality and social psychology, and the philosophy of psychology. Yet, work in these two areas has largely proceeded independently. The assumption on which this volume is founded is that a proper comparison between scientific cognition and folk ways of thought rests on an adequate study of both science and folk psychology. With this in mind, the author provides an analysis of the intricate, and often hidden, links between these two spheres. In doing so, the book poses two related questions. First, what is the nature of folk psychology and how is it related to scientific psychology? Second, of what should the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology consist? In answering these two questions, the author draws extensively from research and arguments in social psychology and social cognition, cognitive science, and the philosophy of science. The interdisciplinary approach gives the book a unique perspective that will be of interest to scholars working in social psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. Written in a concise and accessible style, this volume is suitable for undergraduate and graduate students as well as a general psychological audience. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind Scott M. Christensen, Dale R. Turner, 2013-04-15 Within the past ten years, the discussion of the nature of folk psychology and its role in explaining behavior and thought has become central to the philosophy of mind. However, no comprehensive account of the contemporary debate or collection of the works that make up this debate has yet been available. Intending to fill this gap, this volume begins with the crucial background for the contemporary debate and proceeds with a broad range of responses to and developments of these works -- from those who argue that folk theory is a misnomer to those who regard folk theory as legitimately explanatory and necessary for any adequate account of human behavior. Intended for courses in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and science, as well as anthropology and social psychology, this anthology is also of great value in courses focusing on folk models, eliminative materialism, explanation, psychological theory, and -- in particular -- intentional psychology. It is accessible to both graduate students and upper-division undergraduate students of philosophy and psychology as well as researchers. As an aid to students, a thorough discussion of the field and the articles in the anthology is provided in the introduction; as an aid to researchers, a complete bibliography is also provided. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology Matthew Ratcliffe, 2016-01-13 This book offers arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology, a view which Ratcliffe suggests is a theoretically motivated abstraction. His alternative account draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology, exploring patterned interactions in shared social situations. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Psychosemantics Jerry A. Fodor, 1987-06-19 Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position. This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden. A Bradford Book. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Moral Psychology, Volume 1 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Christian B. Miller, 2007-10-19 Philosophers and psychologists discuss new collaborative work in moral philosophy that draws on evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience. For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field. The contributors to volume 1 discuss recent work on the evolution of moral beliefs, attitudes, and emotions. Each chapter includes an essay, comments on the essay by other scholars, and a reply by the author(s) of the original essay. Topics include a version of naturalism that avoids supposed fallacies, distinct neurocomputational systems for deontic reasoning, the evolutionary psychology of moral sentiments regarding incest, the sexual selection of moral virtues, the evolution of symbolic thought, and arguments both for and against innate morality. Taken together, the chapters demonstrate the value for both philosophy and psychology of collaborative efforts to understand the many complex aspects of morality. Contributors William Casebeer, Leda Cosmides, Oliver Curry, Michael Dietrich, Catherine Driscoll, Susan Dwyer, Owen Flanagan, Jerry Fodor, Gilbert Harman, Richard Joyce, Debra Lieberman, Ron Mallon, John Mikhail, Geoffrey Miller, Jesse Prinz, Peter Railton, Michael Ruse, Hagop Sarkissian, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Valerie Tiberius, John Tooby, Peter Tse, Kathleen Wallace, Arthur Wolf, David Wong |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Folk Psychological Narratives Daniel D. Hutto, 2012-08-24 An argument that challenges the dominant theory theory and simulation theory approaches to folk psychology by claiming that our everyday understanding of intentional actions done for reasons is acquired by exposure to and engaging in specific kinds of narratives. Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans—our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons—are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In Folk Psychological Narratives, Daniel Hutto challenges this view (held in somewhat different forms by the two dominant approaches, theory theory and simulation theory) and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children acquire this practical skill only by being exposed to and engaging in a distinctive kind of narrative practice. Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Future of Folk Psychology John D. Greenwood, 1991-10-25 The essays in this volume are concerned with our everyday and developed scientific systems of explanation of human behavior in terms of beliefs, attitudes, memories, and the like. The volume provides an introduction to the lively contemporary debate about the status and theoretical viability of such forms of folk-psychological explanation, in the light of recent developments in neurobiology and cognitive science. It can be used as a textbook for advanced courses in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology Garth J. O. Fletcher, 1995 The examination and evaluation of folk psychology and lay cognition has been carried out predominantly in two domains: personality and social psychology, and the philosophy of psychology. Yet, work in these two areas has largely proceeded independently. The assumption on which this volume is founded is that a proper comparison between scientific cognition and folk ways of thought rests on an adequate study of both science and folk psychology. With this in mind, the author provides an analysis of the intricate, and often hidden, links between these two spheres. In doing so, the book poses two related questions. First, what is the nature of folk psychology and how is it related to scientific psychology? Second, of what should the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology consist? In answering these two questions, the author draws extensively from research and arguments in social psychology and social cognition, cognitive science, and the philosophy of science. The interdisciplinary approach gives the book a unique perspective that will be of interest to scholars working in social psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. Written in a concise and accessible style, this volume is suitable for undergraduate and graduate students as well as a general psychological audience. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Act of Thinking Derek Melser, 2004-09-03 A new theory proposes that thinking is a learned action. In this remarkable monograph, Derek Melser argues that the core assumption of both folk psychology and cognitive science—that thinking goes on in the head—is mistaken. Melser argues that thinking is not an intracranial process of any kind, mental or neural, but is rather a learned action of the person. After an introduction in which he makes a prima facie case that thinking is an action, Melser reviews action-based theories of thinking advanced by Ryle, Vygotsky, Hampshire and others. He then presents his own theory of token concerting, according to which thinking is a special kind of token performance, by the individual, of certain social, concerted activity. He examines the developmental role of concerted activity, the token performance of concerted activity, the functions of speech, the mechanics and uses of covert tokening, empathy, the origins of solo action, the actional nature of perception, and various kinds and aspects of mature thinking. In addition, he analyzes the role of metaphors in the folk notion of mind. While intending his theory as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, Melser aims also at a larger goal: to establish actions as a legitimate philosophical given, self-explanatory and sui generis. To this end, he argues in the final chapter against the possibility of scientific explanation of actions. The Act of Thinking opens up a large new area for philosophical research. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind Scott M. Christensen, Dale R. Turner, 1993 First Published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Cognitive Science Rom Harre, 2002-02-18 This is the first major textbook to offer a truly comprehensive review of cognitive science in its fullest sense. Ranging from artificial intelligence models of neural processes and cognitive psychology to recent discursive and cultural theories, Rom Harré offers an original yet accessible integration of the field. At its core, this textbook addresses the question ′How can psychology become a science?′. The answer is based on a clear account of method and explanation in the natural sciences and how they can be adapted to psychological research. Rom Harré has used his experience of both the natural and the human sciences to create a text on which exciting and insightful courses can be built in many ways. The text is based on the idea that underlying the long history of attempts to create a scientific psychology there are many unexamined presuppositions that must be brought to light. Whether describing language, categorization, memory, the brain or connectionism the book always links our intuitions about how we think, feel and act in the contexts of everyday life to the latest accounts of the neural tools with which we accomplish the cognitive tasks demanded of us. Computational and biological models are used to link the discursive analysis of everyday cognition to the necessary activities of the brain and nervous system. Fluently written and well structured, this is an ideal text for students who want to gain a comprehensive view of the current state of the art with its seeming divergence into studies of meanings and studies of neurology. The book is divided into four basic modules, with suggestions for three lectures in each. The plan is related to the overall pattern of the semester programme. The reader is guided with helpful learning points, sections of study questions for review, and key readings for each chapter. Cognitive Science: A Philosophical Introduction, with its remarkable sweep of themes, past and present, truly introduces ′the science of the mind′ for a new generation of psychology students. Cognitive Science should be indispensable reading for students at all levels taking courses in cognitive science and cognitive psychology, and useful additional course reading in other areas such as social psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy of the mind and linguistics. Key Points · First major textbook to provide a link between computational, philosophical and biological models in an accessible format for students. Presents a new vision of psychology as a scientific discipline. · Breadth of coverage - ranging from artificial intelligence, to key themes & theories in cognitive science (past and present) - language, memory, the brain and behaviour - to recent discursive and cultural theories. · Plenty of student features to help the student and tutor including helpful learning points, study and essay questions and key readings at the end of every chapter. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Economic Theory and Cognitive Science Don Ross, 2007-01-26 In this study, Don Ross explores the relationship of economics to other branches of behavioral science, asking, in the course of his analysis, under what interpretation economics is a sound empirical science. The book explores the relationships between economic theory and the theoretical foundations of related disciplines that are relevant to the day-to-day work of economics—the cognitive and behavioral sciences. It asks whether the increasingly sophisticated techniques of microeconomic analysis have revealed any deep empirical regularities—whether technical improvement represents improvement in any other sense. Casting Daniel Dennett and Kenneth Binmore as its intellectual heroes, the book proposes a comprehensive model of economic theory that, Ross argues, does not supplant, but recovers the core neoclassical insights, and counters the caricaturish conception of neoclassicism so derided by advocates of behavioral or evolutionary economics. Because he approaches his topic from the viewpoint of the philosophy of science, Ross devotes one chapter to the philosophical theory and terminology on which his argument depends and another to related philosophical issues. Two chapters provide the theoretical background in economics, one covering developments in neoclassical microeconomics and the other treating behavioral and experimental economics and evolutionary game theory. The three chapters at the heart of the argument then apply theses from the philosophy of cognitive science to foundational problems for economic theory. In these chapters, economists will find a genuinely new way of thinking about the implications of cognitive science for economics, and cognitive scientists will find in economic behavior, a new testing site for the explanations of cognitive science. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Deconstructing the Mind Stephen P. Stich, 1998 In Deconstructing the Mind, distinguished philosopher Stephen Stich, once a leading advocate of eliminativism, offers a bold and compelling reassessment of this view. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry David J. Cole, J.H. Fetzer, T.L. Rankin, 2012-12-06 This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human. (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. No problem within the field of cognitive inquiry is more difficult than that of developing an adequate conception of the nature of mind and of its mode of operation. Our purpose in compiling the present volume has been to contribute to the pursuit of this objective by bringing together a repre sentative cross-section of the principal approaches and the primary players who are engaged in contemporary debate on these crucial issues. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction composed by David Cole, the senior editor of this work, which provides a background for understanding the major problems and alternative solutions, and ends with a selected bibliography intended to promote further research. If our efforts assist others in dealing with these issues, they will have been worthwhile. J. H. F. David J. Cole et at. (eds. ), Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry, ix. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Phenomenal Intentionality Uriah Kriegel, 2013-01-09 Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science Alvin I. Goldman, 1993 This collection of readings shows how cognitive science can influence most of the primary branches of philosophy, as well as how philosophy critically examines the foundations of cognitive science. Its broad coverage extends beyond current texts that focus mainly on the impact of cognitive science on philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology, to include materials that are relevant to five other branches of philosophy: epistemology, philosophy of science (and mathematics), metaphysics, language, and ethics. The readings are organized by philosophical fields, with selections evenly divided between philosophers and cognitive scientists. They draw on research in numerous areas of cognitive science, including cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, psychology of reasoning and judgment, artificial intelligence, linguistics, and neuropsychology. There are timely treatments of current topics and debates such as the innate understanding of number, children's theory of mind, self-knowledge, consciousness, connectionism, and ethics and cognitive science. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Microcognition Andy Clark, 1989 A guide to parallel distributed processing, an emerging paradigm which is transforming the field of cognitive science. It explains and explores the biological basis of PDP, its psychological importance, and its philosophical relevance - particularly to the study of folk-psychology. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Cognitive Science and the Social Stephen P. Turner, 2018-03-08 The rise of cognitive neuroscience is the most important scientific and intellectual development of the last thirty years. Findings pour forth, and major initiatives for brain research continue. The social sciences have responded to this development slowly--for good reasons. The implications of particular controversial findings, such as the discovery of mirror neurons, have been ambiguous, controversial within neuroscience itself, and difficult to integrate with conventional social science. Yet many of these findings, such as those of experimental neuro-economics, pose very direct challenges to standard social science. At the same time, however, the known facts of social science, for example about linguistic and moral diversity, pose a significant challenge to standard neuroscience approaches, which tend to focus on universal aspects of human and animal cognition. A serious encounter between cognitive neuroscience and social science is likely to be challenging, and transformative, for both parties. Although a literature has developed on proposals to integrate neuroscience and social science, these proposals go in divergent directions. None of them has a developed conception of social life. This book surveys these issues, introduces the basic alternative conceptions both of the mental world and the social world, and show how, with sufficient modification, they can be fit together in plausible ways. The book is not a new theory of anything, but rather an exploration of the critical issues that relate to the social aspects of cognition which expands the topic from the social neuroscience of immediate interpersonal interaction to the whole range of places where social variation interacts with the cognitive. The focus is on the conceptual problems produced by any attempt to take these issues seriously, and also on the new resources and considerations relevant to doing so. But it is also on the need for a revision of social theoretical concepts in order to utilize these resources. The book points to some conclusions, especially about how the process of what was known as socialization needs to be understood in cognitive science friendly terms. But there is no attempt to resolve the underlying issues within cognitive science, which will doubtless persist. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science David Michael Kaplan, 2017 Is the relationship between psychology and neuroscience one of autonomy or mutual constraint and integration? This volume includes new papers from leading philosophers seeking to address this issue by deepening our understanding of the similarities and differences between the explanatory patterns employed across these domains. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Species of Mind Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, 1999-07-26 The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. Colin Allen (a philosopher) and Marc Bekoff (a cognitive ethologist) approach their work from a perspective that considers arguments about evolutionary continuity to be as applicable to the study of animal minds and brains as they are to comparative studies of kidneys, stomachs, and hearts. Cognitive ethologists study the comparative, evolutionary, and ecological aspects of the mental phenomena of animals. Philosophy can provide cognitive ethology with an analytical basis for attributing cognition to nonhuman animals and for studying it, and cognitive ethology can help philosophy to explain mentality in naturalistic terms by providing data on the evolution of cognition. This interdiscipinary approach reveals flaws in common objections to the view that animals have minds. The heart of the book is this reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. All theoretical discussion is carefully tied to case studies, particularly in the areas of antipredatory vigilance and social play, where there are many points of contact with philosophical discussions of intentionality and representation. Allen and Bekoff make specific suggestions about how to use philosophical theories of intentionality as starting points for empirical investigation of animal minds, and they stress the importance of studying animals other than nonhuman primates. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Associative Engines Andy Clark, 1993 Clark charts a fundamental shift from a static, inner-code-oriented conception of the subject matter of cognitive science to a more dynamic, developmentally rich, process-oriented view. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Mindware Andy Clark, 2013-12 Ranging across both standard philosophical territory and the landscape of cutting-edge cognitive science, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Second Edition, is a vivid and engaging introduction to key issues, research, and opportunities in the field. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science Anthony Chemero, 2011-08-19 A proposal for a new way to do cognitive science argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than computation and representation. While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach (which he terms radical embodied cognitive science), puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, “shored up” and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems (reductionism, epistemological skepticism, metaphysical realism, consciousness) through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. “Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher,” Chemero writes in his preface, adding, “I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything.” With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Importance of Being Understood Adam Morton, 2005-06-29 The Importance of Being Understood is an innovative and thought-provoking exploration of the links between the way we think about each other's mental states and the fundamentally cooperative nature of everyday life. Adam Morton begins with a consideration of 'folk psychology', the tendency to attribute emotions, desires, beliefs and thoughts to human minds. He takes the view that it is precisely this tendency that enables us to understand, predict and explain the actions of others, which in turn helps us to decide on our own course of action. This relection suggests, claims Morton, that certain types of cooperative activity are dependent on everyday psychological understanding conversely, that we act in such a way as to make our actions easily intelligible to others so that we can benefit from being understood. This idea of 'beneficial circularities' is at the core of Morton's investigation of the interdependencies between folk psychology and social behaviour: we understand each other because we have learned to make ourselves intelligible. Using examples of cooperative activities such as car driving and playing tennis, Adam Morton analyses the concepts of belief and simulation, the idea of explanation by motive, and the causal force of psychological explanation. In addition to argument and analysis, Morton also includes more speculative explorations of topics such as moral progress and presents a new point of view on how and why cultures differ. The Importance of Being Understood forges new links between ethics and the philosophy of mind and will be of interest to anyone in either field, as well as developmental psychologists. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Mind and Supermind Keith Frankish, 2004-09-16 Mind and Supermind offers an alternative perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Fodor Mark J. Cain, 2013-04-26 Jerry Fodor is one of the most important philosophers of mind in recent decades. He has done much to set the agenda in this field and has had a significant influence on the development of cognitive science. Fodor's project is that of constructing a physicalist vindication of folk psychology and so paving the way for the development of a scientifically respectable intentional psychology. The centrepiece of his engagement in this project is a theory of the cognitive mind, namely, the computational theory of mind, which postulates the existence of a language of thought. Fodor: Language, Mind and Philosophy is a comprehensive study of Fodor's writings. Individual chapters are devoted to each of the major issues raised by his work and contain extensive discussion of his relationships to key developments in cognitive science and to the views of such philosophical luminaries as Dennett, Davidson and Searle. This accessible book will appeal to advanced level undergraduate students of philosophy and related disciplines. It will also be of great interest to professional philosophers and cognitive scientists. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: An Invitation to Cognitive Science Justin Lieber, 1994-07-19 Professor Leiber's exuberant but incisive book illuminates the inquiry's beginnings in Plato, in the physiology and psychology of Descartes, in the formal work of Russell and Gödel, and in Wittgenstein's critique of folk psychology. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science Keith Frankish, William Ramsey, 2012-07-19 An authoritative, up-to-date survey of the state of the art in cognitive science, written for non-specialists. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Folk Psychology Martin Davies, Tony Stone, 1995-11-15 Many philosophers and psychologists argue that normal adult human beings possess a primitive or 'folk' psychological theory. Recently, however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative . This alternative view says that human bings are able to predict and explain each others' actions by using the resources of their own minds to simuate the psychological etiology of the actions of others. The thirteen essays in this volume present the foundations of theory of mind debate, and are accompanied by an extensive introduction. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Mental Simulation Martin Davies, Tony Stone, 1995-12-04 Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive 'folk' psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other's actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others. This book and the companion volume Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: The Continuum Companion to Philosophy of Mind James Garvey, 2011-04-28 A comprehensive reference guide to current research in Philosophy of Mind, assembled by an international team of leading scholars in the discipline. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Thinking and Seeing Daniel T. Levin, 2004 A collection in which the contributors draw on diverse areas of cognitive science to examine the difference between actual and presumed visual cognition. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Current Controversies in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Adam J Lerner, Simon Cullen, Sarah-Jane Leslie, 2023-05-31 In this volume, leading researchers debate five core questions in the philosophy of cognitive science. For each topic, the volume provides two essays, each advocating for an opposing approach. |
| from folk psychology to cognitive science: Epistemology and Cognition Alvin I. Goldman, 1986 Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account. |
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Folk music is a music genre that includes traditional folk music and the contemporary genre that evolved from the former during the 20th-century …
FOLK | English meaning - Cambridge Dictionary
FOLK definition: 1. people, especially those of a particular group or type: 2. used when speaking informally to …
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Folk Alliance International (FAI) is an international arts nonprofit that exist to keep the tradition of folk music thriving through preservation, presentation, …
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FOLK Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster
How to use folk in a sentence. people generally; a certain kind, class, or group of people; the persons of one's own family; especially : parents… See the full definition
Folk music - Wikipedia
Folk music is a music genre that includes traditional folk music and the contemporary genre that evolved from the former during the 20th-century folk revival. Some types of folk music may be …
FOLK | English meaning - Cambridge Dictionary
FOLK definition: 1. people, especially those of a particular group or type: 2. used when speaking informally to a…. Learn more.
Folk Alliance International – Promoting, Preserving, & Presenting Folk …
Folk Alliance International (FAI) is an international arts nonprofit that exist to keep the tradition of folk music thriving through preservation, presentation, and promotion.
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folk - people in general (often used in the plural); "they're just country folk"; "folks around here drink moonshine"; "the common people determine the group character and preserve its …
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Discover everything about the word "FOLK" in English: meanings, translations, synonyms, pronunciations, examples, and grammar insights - all in one comprehensive guide.
